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ABSTRACT
The growth of online alternative lending presents several
advantages for both those seeking credit and those with excess
capital to lend. Over the past decade, several different models of
peer-to-peer lending have emerged in the US and U.K. Each of
these models has developed in response to the different regulatory
system it faces, which has led to the models’ different risk and
reward profiles. However, the current regulatory framework for
regulating peer-to-peer lending, especially in the U.S., leaves
much to be desired. The inadequate regulatory regime not only
hampers the potential for growth and further innovation in the
industry, but also creates risks for consumers, lenders, and, as the
sector grows, entire markets. There is no clear or easy answer as
to the optimal regulatory regime, but regulators should at least
consider the basic functions of peer-to-peer lending and how to
address risks with a more comprehensive and sensible model for
regulation.

INTRODUCTION
Peer-to-peer lending has existed in many formats and many
cultures1 for some time. Today, potential borrowers can go on websites
like Prosper.com or LendingClub.com and input their financial
information. Then, these sites filter that information through a proprietary
formula for assessing creditworthiness before anonymously advertising
the information to potential lenders who wish to fund that consumer’s
loan.2 The rise of the internet has created huge potential for the
†

Duke University School of Law, Juris Doctor 2016. Special thanks to Professor
Steven L. Schwarcz for his guidance and advice. This paper owes a debt to his
work on Regulating Financial Change: A Functional Approach (August 8, 2014),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2469467.
1
See, e.g., Eric C. Chaffee & Geoffrey C. Rapp, Regulating Online Peer-to-Peer
Lending in the Aftermath of Dodd-Frank: In Search of an Evolving Regulatory
Regime for an Evolving Industry, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 485, 497 (2012)
(discussing the existence of informal peer-to-peer lending networks within
Chinese, Mexican, and Korean communities in the U.S. and abroad).
2
See How It Works, PROSPER, https://www.prosper.com (last visited Apr. 14,
2015); How Does an Online Credit Marketplace Work, LENDING CLUB,
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disintermediation of financial services.3 Just as Web 1.0 websites such as
eBay.com allowed the buyers and sellers of goods to connect directly and
efficiently over large distances,4 other technology companies like Paypal
made forays into business-lines that were previously the exclusive
province of banks and other financial services sector players.5 Thus, it
wasn’t long before companies’ websites like Prosper.com and
LendingClub.com in the US, Zopa.com in the UK, and other Web 2.0
platforms began experimenting with models of lending that would by-pass
the traditional bank lending experience. These models would directly
connect individuals and small businesses seeking funds with other
individuals and businesses (now typically hedge funds) with excess capital
to lend.6
Since the early 2000s the Peer-to-Peer (P2P) Lending industry has
grown into a multi-billion dollar, global industry.7 P2P lenders have grown
both in number and complexity along with the industry. The
Prosper/Lending Club model discussed below is no longer the only model
of P2P lending.8 Instead, innovators in this space have developed a variety
of models for sourcing capital to fund these loans, while other innovators

https://www.lendingclub.com/public/how-peer-lending-works.action (last visited
Apr. 14, 2015).
3
Disintermediation refers to the process of removing the process of or going
around the traditional intermediaries in a transaction. In the lending context,
banks, credit unions, pay-day lenders served as intermediaries connecting those
with capital (often in the form of bank deposits) with borrowers seeking funds.
4
See generally Who We Are, EBAY, http://www.ebayinc.com/who_we_are/one
_company (last visited May 26, 2016).
5
See id. Paypal Holdings, Inc. is now a subsidiary of eBay, Inc.
6
See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., PERSON-TO-PERSON LENDING: NEW
REGULATORY CHALLENGES COULD EMERGE AS THE INDUSTRY GROWS (2011)
[hereinafter GAO, PERSON-TO-PERSON LENDING], http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d11613.pdf; Tracy Alloway, Peer-to-Peer Lending Comes of Age as
Wall Street Muscles In, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2014), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/
0/d6903c54-4447-11e4-8abd-00144feabdc0.html#axzz49knqQTh6 (last visited
May 26, 2016) (discussing the growing role of traditional financial sector players
like institutional investors in funding P2P Lending); PEER2PEER FIN. ASSOC.,
PEER-TO-PEER FINANCE: MARKET DATA 2 (2014) [hereinafter P2PFA, MARKET
DATA (2014)],
http://p2pfa.info/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Peer-to-PeerLending-DataSheet-Q3-v3.pdf.
7
See P2PFA, MARKET DATA (2014), supra note 6, at 2.
8
See, e.g., Mike Butcher, Landbay Brings The P2P Finance Model To Buy-ToLet In The UK, TECH CRUNCH (Apr. 11, 2014), http://techcrunch.com/2014/04/
11/landbay-brings-the-p2p-finance-model-to-buy-to-let-in-the-uk/.
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have identified niche spaces and markets in which to concentrate their
lending activity.9
Currently, the SEC is responsible for regulating P2P lenders in the
U.S.10 This means that P2P lenders are in the position of either registering
the loans (i.e. notes that correspond to the loans)11 or finding an exemption
to Section 5 of the ’33 Act.12 The consumer-side (i.e. borrower-side) of the
transaction is still governed by state usury laws and, now, potentially the
federal Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”).13 The U.K., the
country where most of the world’s other major P2P lenders reside,
regulates P2P lending through its Financial Conduct Authority (“FCA”).14
The FCA is in some ways like a hybrid of the CFPB and SEC, as its
mandate includes consumer credit protection, broker-dealer oversight,
insider-trading and market-abuse prosecutions.15 P2P Lending in the U.K.
is additionally overseen by the Peer2Peer Finance Association, a selfregulatory organization, which promulgates standards and best practices
for member-firms operating in the sector.16 Right now, these two
regulatory models serve as the only existing examples of ways to approach
P2P lending.
9

See, e.g., Michael J. de la Merced, After Year of Growth, Prosper Buys a Surgical
Procedures Lender, DEAL BOOK (Jan. 27, 2015), http://dealbook.
nytimes.com/2015/01/27/after-year-of-growth-prosper-buys-a-surgicalprocedures-lender/ (discussing a P2P lender bought by Prosper that focuses
exclusively on providing P2P loans for elective surgical procedures).
10
Paul Slattery, Square Pegs in A Round Hole: Sec Regulation of Online Peer-toPeer Lending and the CFPB Alternative, 30 YALE J. ON REG. 233, 254–258
(2013).
11
Prosper and Lending Club, the two largest P2P lenders in the U.S. have decided
to register their securities with the SEC. See id.
12
Other P2P Lenders in the U.S. have presumably used § 3(a)(11), see Press
Release, Jackellyn Trinh, GROUNDFLOOR, Groundfloor Launches Landmark
Securities Offering to Enable Crowdfunding of Real Estate Transactions (Apr.
29, 2014) (explaining that it previously restricted investors to Georgia residents),
or have sold exclusively to accredited investors presumably under a Regulation D
offering, see PATCH OF LAND, https://patchofland.com (last visited March 3,
2015).
13
GAO, PERSON-TO-PERSON LENDING, supra note 6, at 5.
14
Financial Conduct Authority, Un-official Outline of FCA Regulatory
Requirements for Peer-to-Peer Lending Platforms (2014), p2pfa.info/wpcontent/uploads/2014/06/FCA-P2P-regulation-vf.docx.
15
The FCA was created by the Financial Services Act (2012) (U.K), which
enumerated the powers of the FCA and its counter-part the Prudential Regulation
Authority, which primarily regulates the banking sector. See Financial Services
Act, 2012, cl. 21 (UK).
16
Rules and Membership Criteria of P2PFA, PEER2PEER FIN. ASSOC.,
http://p2pfa.info/rules (last visited May 26, 2016).
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While the U.K. system lends itself to a more systematic and
comprehensive approach to P2P lending, both the U.S. and U.K.
regulatory systems seem backward-looking—focusing on the consumer
credit abuses of the past—rather than identifying the ways P2P lenders
function within the financial system in the present. The purpose of this
note is to survey the different models of P2P lending and take a functional
approach in identifying the strengths and weaknesses that result from those
models. Part I will explore the history and regulation of P2P lending
focusing mostly on the U.S., using the U.K. as a point of comparison. Part
II will examine examples of different models of P2P lending and the
regulatory requirements each model faces. Part III will look at the financial
functions of P2P lending on both a microprudential and macroprudential
level, noting the effect of different models of P2P lending on these
functions. By doing this, the hope is that regulators, innovators, and
students of P2P lending can design comprehensive and systematic
regulatory solutions that take full advantage of P2P lending’s innovative
approach to solving problems in the financial sector.17

I. REGULATING THE PEER-TO-PEER LENDER: THE HISTORY AND
CURRENT STATE OF THINGS
The regulation of P2P lenders in the US involves oversight by
various state and federal regulators.18 Much of the current debate over the
regulation of P2P lending in the U.S. has focused on an early draft of
Dodd-Frank proposed by the House of Representatives that would have
moved responsibility for regulating the industry from the SEC to the newly
formed CFPB. While the final version of Dodd Frank did not contain such
a provision, it did require the GAO to study the issue and publish a report.19
Congress has taken no further action on designating an agency to oversee
P2P lending.20 Thus, the discussion below will focus primarily on the role
of the SEC and the debate over whether the CFPB is a better candidate for
supervising the industry.
The U.K.’s regulation of P2P lenders benefited from a complete
overhaul of the U.K.’s regulatory approach to financial services regulation
in 2012.21 Thus, it is worth considering the U.K.’s single agency approach
This “functional approach” is borrowed from Steven Schwarcz, Regulating
Financial Change: A Functional Approach, 100(4) MINN. L.R. 1441 (2015)
[hereinafter Schwarcz, Regulating Financial Change].
18
GAO, PERSON-TO-PERSON LENDING, supra note 6, at 2.
19
See Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 989F, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
20
See Andrew Verstein, The Misregulation of Person-to-Person Lending, 45 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 445, 450 (2011).
21
See generally Philip Rawlings, All Change: The Fall of the FSA and the Further
Rise of the Bank of England, 30 No. 4 BANKING & FIN. SERVS. POL’Y REP. 16
17
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to regulating P2P lending as a point of comparison in considering the
merits of such a system.

A. Regulation by the SEC
The federal regulation of P2P lending in the U.S. started in earnest
with the SEC’s action against Prosper Marketplace (“Prosper”) in 2008.22
Prior to the SEC’s action it was unclear whether P2P lenders were issuing
securities within the bounds of federal securities laws when connecting
lenders and borrowers.23 The SEC’s action forced Prosper to register the
notes it issued to those providing the capital to fund its consumer loans,24
which also resulted in Lending Club suspending operations for several
months in order to voluntarily register its notes.25
The SEC imposed registration requirements on Prosper and
Lending Club largely due to the way the two companies structure their
transactions.26 The companies use their online platforms to identify
borrowers and then apply proprietary risk-appraisal methods to determine
borrowers’ creditworthiness and the appropriate interest rates.27 The
platforms also let lenders make loans anonymously to the borrowers based
on these proprietary formulas.28 At this point, however, the lender does not
directly lend their money through the platform to that buyer.29 Instead,
borrowers using Lending Club or Prosper receive loans from WebBank,
an FDIC-insured bank based in Utah.30 The online platforms then purchase
the loan and issue a corresponding note for that loan to the lender.31 The
P2P platform is responsible for servicing the loan and passing on proceeds
to the lender.32 The P2P platform makes money in these transactions by

(2011) (discussing the restructuring financial services regulation in the U.K. after
the 2008 financial crisis).
22
Prosper Marketplace, Securities Act Release No. 8984.
23
Paul Slattery, supra note 10, at 252.
24
See id.; Prosper Marketplace, Securities Act Release No. 8984.
25
Carl E. Smith, If It's Not Broken, Don't Fix It: The SEC's Regulation of Peerto-Peer Lending, 6 BUS. L. BRIEF (AM. U.) 21, 22–23 (2010).
26
Id. at 21–22; see also Prosper Marketplace, Securities Act Release No. 8984.
27
Id.; GAO, PERSON-TO-PERSON LENDING, supra note 6, at 11–12. Prosper
originally allowed lenders to bid on an interest rate, but switched to designating
an interest rate based on a proprietary formula in 2010. See also Chaffee & Rapp,
supra note 1, at 494.
28
See Slattery, supra note 10, at 236.
29
See GAO, PERSON-TO-PERSON LENDING, supra note 6, at 10–14.
30
See id.
31
Id.
32
Id. at 13.
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charging an origination fee for the loan and then a servicing fee on the
payments.33
In the Prosper enforcement action, the SEC determined that these
notes qualified as securities under SEC v. W.J.Howey Co. and Reves v.
Ernst & Young.34 The Howey investment contract was easy for the SEC to
meet.35 Prosper (and Lending Club) serves as a promoter for a common
investment scheme and investors rely on the expertise of the P2P platforms
to find opportunities and operate.36 The SEC also successfully argued that
the note issued by the P2P platforms did not fall into any of the exemptions
found in Reves.37 This meant that each note sold to investors would need
to meet Section 5 of the 1933 Act’s requirements.38 Thus, the result of the
SEC’s actions was a chilling effect on other P2P platforms following the
Prosper and Lending Club model.39
Other P2P lenders in the U.S. have avoided the registration of their
securities by limiting participation on the lender-side to accredited or
institutional investors.40 At least one other P2P lending platform tested its
model using a § 3(a)(11) intrastate offering, but, in a relatively short time
decided to submit to the expense and heightened regulatory scrutiny that
accompanies registration.41 These approaches allow new entrants into the
P2P lending space to experiment with different models and in different
markets, but in other ways diminishes some of the overall goals of P2P
Lending—namely the disintermediation of financing and connecting
borrowers and willing lenders.

33

Verstein, supra note 20, at 454.
See generally Prosper Marketplace, Securities Act Release No. 8984. For a
thorough summary and analysis of the SEC’s action, see Chaffee & Rapp, supra
note 1, at 509–19.
35
Chaffee & Rapp, supra note 1, at 509–19.
36
Id. at 509–14.
37
Id. at 514.
38
See Verstein, supra note 20, at 476.
39
See id. at 490. See, e.g., Giles Andrews, The Tricky World of US Regulation,
ZOPA BLOG (Nov. 28, 2008), http://blog.zopa.com/archives/2008/11/28/thetricky-world-of-us-regulation.
40
Se,e e.g., PATCH OF LAND, https://patchofland.com (last visited May 26, 2016).
Patch of Land takes advantage of the 506(c) exemption created by the JOBS Act,
which allows for the advertisement of Regulation D offerings so long as the issuer
using the exemption only sells to accredited investors and has some means of
confirming all of the purchasers qualify, in fact, as accredited investors. See id.
See also Exemption for limited offers and sales without regard to dollar amount
of offering, 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c).
41
See, e.g., Trinh, supra note 12.
34
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B. Dodd Frank and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
During the 2008 Financial Crisis, traditional lines of credit
became nearly impossible for ordinary individuals and small businesses to
access.42 Nonetheless, P2P lending continued to grow during the crisis.43
The original House version of the Dodd Frank Act exempted P2P lending
from SEC oversight.44 Instead, the House bill designated the newly created
CFPB as the appropriate regulator for the P2P lending industry.45 Scholars
have argued that the new agency, with its focus on protecting consumers,
could best consolidate the regulation of P2P lending and help the nascent
industry avoid the current regulatory environment that subjects platforms
to “at least ten federal statutes and as many agencies.”46 Thus, arguments
in favor of the CFBP taking up regulatory responsibility for P2P lending
focuses on two points—first, the benefits of a single regulator, and,
second, the consumer credit focus of the new agency.47
The benefits of a single regulator in the CFPB are obvious. Rather
than subjecting existing P2P lenders and new entrants to regulation by
various state and federal agencies, P2P lenders could benefit from the
certainty that comes with interfacing with a single regulator. Proponents
of the CFPB as a single regulator model also note that having a single
regulator with a broad mandate overseeing P2P lending means that the
regulator can be much more responsive to innovations and new models of
P2P lending.48
The broad mandate of the CFPB also supports arguments for a
single CFPB regulator. The CFPB’s mandate contains a “catchall
jurisdiction to regulate any entity that the CFPB has ‘reasonable cause to
determine’ poses a risk to consumers in financial transactions.”49 This
broad mandate gives the CFPB far more flexibility to tailor regulation to
the unique benefits and threats posed by individual P2P lenders and the
industry at large.50 The SEC, on the other hand, traditionally operated on
a narrower mandate that focuses on protecting investors through
42

Slattery, supra note 10, at 235.
See id.
44
Id. at 253–54.
45
See id.
46
Id. at 237.
47
See, e.g., id.; see also GAO, PERSON-TO-PERSON LENDING, supra note 6, at 36–
37 (discussing the role and powers of the CFPB generally).
48
See Slattery, supra note 10, at 264 (explaining that the CFPB’s broad
jurisdictional grant “could allow the CFPB to uniformly regulate P2P lending
platforms, regardless of their particular business models,” thus best positioning
the CFPB to serve as a unified regulator for P2P platforms).
49
See id.
50
Id.
43
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disclosure requirements.51 This narrower focus on investors poses
problems with regard to the P2P lending industry and its involvement with
both “investors” (i.e. those lending money through the platforms) and the
mostly individual and small business consumers that turn to P2P lending
platforms.52
Arguments in favor of a single regulator in the form of the CFPB
have garnered much attention and support.53 However, rather than include
the House proposal in the final version of Dodd-Frank, Congress opted to
have the Government Accountability Office (GAO) study the issue
further.54 The study took a comprehensive look at the structure of the
industry, the current regulatory environment, the possibility of having the
CFPB as a single regulator, and the effects of maintaining the status quo.55
Still, the GAO’s conclusion left much to be desired. The GAO essentially
found that either the current system or the CFPB as a single regulator
system had merits and recommended a sort of wait-and-see approach.56
Thus, P2P platforms find themselves in the same place today as they did
in 2008—registering with the SEC (or finding an exemption) while
struggling to comply with various state and other federal regulations.

C. The U.K.’s Regulation of P2P Lenders: A point of comparison
The U.K.’s regulatory system for financial services looks very
different from the U.S. system. For several years beginning in 2000, the
U.K. had a single regulator for financial services under the auspices of the
Financial Services Administration.57 After the financial crisis, the
deficiencies and inefficiencies of the single regulator system became
apparent.58 The U.K.’s response was to create three different, independent
51

SEC, What We Do, https://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last modified
June 10, 2013) (noting “the mission of the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission is to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets,
and facilitate capital formation”).
52
Cf. Slattery, supra note 10, at 274 (discussing the inflexibility of the SEC and
its sole focus on investors).
53
See, e.g., id; Verstein, supra note 20; Chaffee & Rapp, supra note 1. But see
Smith, supra note 25 (arguing against SEC regulation generally).
54
See GAO, PERSON-TO-PERSON LENDING, supra note 6, at 2; Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-113, § 989F, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §5301).
55
See GAO, PERSON-TO-PERSON LENDING, supra note 6, at 42.
56
See id. at 56–57.
57
Philip Rawlings, All Change: The Fall of the FSA and the Further Rise of the
Bank of England, 30 No. 4 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL’Y REP. 16, 20 (2011)
(discussing the restructuring financial services regulation in the U.K. after the
2008 financial crisis).
58
Id.
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regulators under the supervision of the Bank of England and with
responsibilities to the Treasury as well.59
As of 2014, the Financial Conduct Authority (“FCA”) retains
responsibility for regulating P2P lending in the U.K.60 The FCA’s broad
mandate and coverage of financial services activities and firms may give
it the power and flexibility to adapt to a changing industry and promulgate
regulations specifically tailored to the industry. FCA’s work in the P2P
lending sector appears promising thus far.
The FCA’s regulations are broader than those in the U.S. While
the SEC mandates disclosure and the CFPB maintains consumer
protection measures, the FCA’s regulation includes mechanisms for
disclosure, consumer protection, and, importantly, capital requirements
for P2P lenders.61 The FCA’s focus on all the parties involved—investors,
borrowers, and the integrity of the financial system—results in a much
more comprehensive approach to regulation.62
As mentioned before, especially important is the prudential63
approach to regulation that is part of the FCA’s model.64 P2P lenders are
part of the disintermediation of financial services, but in some ways are

59

See generally Financial Services Act, 2012, cl. 21 (UK). The regulators
responsible for the financial services sector in the U.K. include the Prudential
Regulation Authority, the Financial Conduct Authority, and the Financial Policy
Committee. Id. The Prudential Regulation Authority is primarily responsible for
the prudential regulation of the banking sector. Id. The Financial Policy
Committee is the least powerful of the three and is primarily a macroprudential
regulator with limited abilities to promulgate direct regulations. Id. The Financial
Conduct Authority is tasked with regulating the intersection between consumers
and the financial sector. Id. It regulates broker-dealer activities, financial fraud,
insider trading, and consumer credit in addition to P2P lending. See id.
60
Jonathan Moules, Government Boost for Peer-to-Peer Lending, FIN. TIMES
(Dec. 7, 2012, 12:17 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/1d7a4a16-4061-11e28e04-00144feabdc0.html?siteedition=uk#axzz3TdyCwwxR.
61
FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., THE FCA’S REGULATORY APPROACH TO
CROWDFUNDING OVER THE INTERNET, AND THE PROMOTION OF NON-READILY
REALISABLE SECURITIES BY OTHER MEDIA (2014), http://www.fca.org.uk/static/
documents/policy-statements/ps14-04.pdf.
62
See id.
63
Here, prudential regulation or regulators most often refers to the types of
regulations to which banks or banking entities are subject. These regulations
typically focus on capital requirements, loan-to-value ratios, and other best
practices rather than solely on disclosure.
64
Cf. id. (discussing the minimum capital standards required by the FCA for
online lending platforms).
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providing many of the same services as banks.65 Thus, the FCA
implementation of prudential regulations in addition to consumer
protection and disclosure makes sense given the nature of P2P lending. Its
efforts create a strong point of reference for the U.S. and others. Finally,
the FCA also has a role in the U.K.’s macroprudential policy through its
chief executive’s membership on the board of the Financial Policy
Committee, the U.K.’s primary macroprudential regulator.66

II. DIFFERENT MODELS OF PEER-TO-PEER LENDING
Different models of P2P lending have developed in response to
changes in the market and the regulatory environment after 2008. Before
examining these P2P lenders by taking a functional approach, it is
important to take a look at the different models of P2P lending currently
in existence along with some of the unique benefits and risks features of
each model.

A. The Loan-to-Note Model: Prosper, Lending Club, and Zopa
This model is the most common and probably the largest by
volume of loans.67 As previously discussed, these platforms rely on a
local FDIC-insured bank—WebBank in the case of both Lending Club
and Prosper—to extend bank loans to consumers.68 The loan is purchased
by the P2P platform, which then sells a note to the lender based on the
lender’s selection of either a specific loan or a category of loans.69 The
lender makes money through both an origination fee and a service fee
taken out of the interest payments made on the loan.70

65

See Smith, supra note 25, at 21 (discussing how P2P lenders manager loans and
provide information about borrowers to lenders); Verstein, supra note 20, at 254.
66
Donald Kohn, Senior Fellow, The Brookings Inst., Address at the Kennedy
School of Government: Institutions for Macroprudential Regulation: The UK and
the U.S. (Apr. 17, 2014), www.brookings.edu/research/speeches/2014/04/ 17institutions-macroprudential-regulation-kohn.
67
See Chaffee & Rapp, supra note 1, at 493–94.
68
GAO, PERSON-TO-PERSON LENDING, supra note 6, at 11–13.
69
Id.
70
Verstein, supra note 20, at 454.
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Figure 171
The payment on the note by the platform to the lender is
contingent upon continued payment by the consumer borrower.72 While
the lenders admit a duty to “use commercially reasonable” efforts to
collect on delinquent loans, these efforts are attended by high fees.73 This
feature is important, as it greatly reduces or eliminates most of the
default risk for the P2P platform and places the risk on the lender.74
The default risk—how frequently consumers defaulted— is the
primary risk posed by this model. Early on in the life of Prosper, its
default rate on loans made through the platform was high.75 Lending
Club’s default rate was lower, but it also restricted its loans to consumers
with much higher credit scores.76 The danger occurs because the P2P
platform has little incentive to pursue repayment when borrowers default.
Their own liability to the lender is contingent upon the borrower’s
repayment, and the size of the loans makes it economically inefficient for
71

GAO, PERSON-TO-PERSON LENDING, supra note 6, at 12 (illustrating the
mechanics of P2P lending platforms such as Prosper and Lending Club).
72
Slattery, supra note 10, at 248.
73
Id. at 248–49.
74
Id. What is even more concerning is that Lending Club “reserves the right to
issue debt senior to lenders’ rights secured by payment on the loans lenders fund.”
Id. at 251.
75
See id. at 248 (discussing how default rates on loans made by Prosper were
originally as high as 36%).
76
Id. Prosper also adjusted its eligibility terms to raise the minimum credit score
for borrowers eligible to take out a loan using the site. Since then, its default rate
has decreased to be more in-line with Lending Club’s. See Verstein, supra note
20, at 453.
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the sites to track down every delinquent borrower.77 Certainly, as major
players in the field, there is a reputational incentive to make sure that
borrowers are creditworthy, so that the sites can continue to attract
lenders. But it is probably only the high costs of SEC registration78 that
prevent less scrupulous platforms from taking advantage of this
mismatch of incentives.

B. Pure Crowdfunding and Market Place Model
The high costs and enhanced scrutiny stemming from SEC
registration has probably led some sites to take advantage of exemptions
by catering to accredited investors.79 Currently, this model exists primarily
for P2RE (Peer to Real Estate) loans,80 which involves crowdfunding
short-term construction, rehabilitation, or other real-estate-focused
projects.81 This model also seems appealing and suited for those who wish
to target the small business market.82
The entrance of institutional investors such as hedge funds will
probably pose the most interesting challenges for this type of lending. 83
The promise of a democratized system of truly peer-to-peer lending is
threatened whenever the pool of potential lenders is restricted to those who
qualify as accredited investors. But more importantly, the rise of
secondary markets and securitization for these types of loans84 reintroduces some of the same dangers, such a moral hazard or risk
transmission, that financial disintermediation promises to address.

C. Shadow Banking Model
Though not properly P2P lenders, online lending platforms that
operate in the same market and use the same technologies as P2P platforms
merit some consideration. OnDeck is probably the largest of these new

77

Slattery, supra note 10, at 248–50.
Id. at 256. Prosper spent over $5 million on compliance costs in 2010. Id. at
258.
79
See, e.g., PATCH OF LAND, https://patchofland.com (last visited May 26, 2016);
Butcher, supra note 8.
80
Groundfloor is another example of real estate-focused P2P platform that until
recently used intrastate offering exemptions in order to crowdfund projects. See
Trinh, supra note 12. Recently, however, they decided to register their securities
in order to scale their business and offer loans outside of Georgia. See id.
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William Alden, Start-Up Lendoor Aims to Use Crowdfunding for SmallBusiness Loans, DEAL BOOK (Oct. 29, 2014), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/
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online lending shadow banking firms.85 OnDeck operates more like a
traditional banking or shadow banking entity by lending money backed by
its own capital.86 Like the major true P2P lending platforms, OnDeck uses
advanced, proprietary technology to weigh the risks posed by usually
small business borrowers.87 OnDeck also sells many of these loans in
secondary markets,88 which creates the potential for the lax underwriting
standards by firms operating in this market.89

D. Micro-Finance Model
Micro-finance websites like Kiva operate in much the same way
as Lending Club or Prosper.90 These sites allow individuals who may be
committed to a cause, such as funding women in the third world who are
starting a business, to provide the capital necessary to fund small-scale
economic development.91 The amounts of these loans are not necessarily
smaller than those found on Lending Club or Prosper.92
The money is aggregated by the P2P and transferred to the
platform’s “field partners” who vet and collect repayment from the
borrower.93 The field partners are paid interest by the borrower, but the
lender providing the money is not paid any interest.94
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See Jeremy Quittner, How OnDeck's IPO Went Off Without a Hitch, INC. (Dec.
18, 2014), http://www.inc.com/jeremy-quittner/ondeck-capital-ipo-and-the-jobsact.html. Shadow banking is a term used to describe intermediaries that participate
in the creation and sale of credit, but are not regulated as traditional banks.
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Id.
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Id.
88
Id.
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However, nothing indicates that OnDeck’s lending or underwriting standards
are lax or below par in any way. Rather, the model examined here comes with
many of the same structural dangers one sees in mortgage brokers and other
lenders that make money sourcing loans, but don’t necessarily keep “skin in the
game.” The lax (or non-existent) underwriting standards of many mortgage
brokers in the years leading up the financial crisis was, of course, dangerous
enough to contribute to the worst recession since the Great Depression.
90
See generally Kevin Davis & Anna Gelpern, Peer-To-Peer Financing for
Development: Regulating The Intermediaries, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1209
(2010).
91
Steven L. Schwarcz, Disintermediating Avarice: A Legal Framework for
Commercially Sustainable Microfinance, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1165, 1167–68
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Figure 295
Using the no-interest system on the lender-side avoids forcing
these types of P2P entities from needing to register with the SEC.96
Because they are charities, they might be subject to other forms of
regulation in order to maintain their 501(c)(3) status.97 The danger in this
model is not really to the lender, who is presumably providing capital out
of generosity, but to the borrower who still pays high interest rates to the
field partners.98 These interest rates can sometimes even exceed the rates
charged by pay-day lenders in the U.S.99

E. Regulating the Different Types of P2P Lenders
As discussed, different P2P lenders pose different risks and
benefits to lenders and borrowers. An optimal regulatory solution to a
highly diverse field should not focus too much on the specific structure of
these transactions and platforms, since they are likely to change and
evolve. Rather, regulations should focus on the general functions of P2P
lending. It is yet unclear what government entity or regulator would be
positioned best to lead the charge on regulating P2P platforms.100
However, the following section will discuss an approach that any or all of
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100
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the regulators could take to address the P2P lending sector in all of its
various manifestations.

III. TAKING A FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO THE REGULATION OF
PEER-TO-PEER LENDERS
In an article on regulating financial change, Prof. Steven Schwarcz
suggests taking a “functional approach” to the regulation of financial
services.101 He, like many others, has noted that too much of the regulation
of financial services is backwards-looking.102 Instead, Schwarcz
encourages regulators to look at the core functions of finance in order to
understand the basic contours and operations of the system.103 In this way,
regulators can avoid constantly trying to regulate the newest product,
transaction, or threat, but can approach regulation in a way that addresses
the risks at the very heart of the financial system.104
Given the potential blank regulatory slate for an industry like P2P
lending,105 a functional approach provides a strong starting point for
framing future discussions about regulation. Though Schwarcz focuses on
the microprudential and macroprudential functions and risk separately in
his article,106 it is worth examining these functions together. That way, the
macroprudential risks of the P2P industry may be better understood.

A. Functions of Peer-to-Peer Lending
The various functions discussed below are those noted and
examined in Schwarcz’s article on regulating financial change.107 Again,
they provide a useful framework for understanding P2P lending’s place in
the financial system and can be used to focus conversations about the risks
and benefits of different models of P2P lending.
1. Disaggregation and Efficient Funding
Disaggregation is the spreading of financial participation and risk
amongst those in the best position to put capital to its highest and best
use.108 On the other hand, failures in information-access and rationality
101

See generally Schwarcz, Regulating Financial Change, supra note 17.
See, e.g., Barry Eichengreen, Euro Area Risk (Mis)management, in
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(Edward Balleisen et al., eds.) (forthcoming); see also Schwarcz, Regulating
Financial Change, supra note 17.
103
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107
See generally id.
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present two barriers to the efficient functioning of capital markets.109 P2P
lending has the potential to overcome these barriers by increasing
disaggregation.110
P2P lending platforms’ greatest strengths are in this area. Not only
do they open up lending and borrowing to greater numbers of people, but
they also use technology to address some of the information and rationality
failures previously faced.111 The real value of Prosper and Lending Club
along with the other P2P lenders’ is their ability to efficiently evaluate the
credit worthiness of borrowers and disseminate that information amongst
the largest possible pool of potential investors.112
Thus, any regulation in this space should focus on making sure the
information gathered and disseminated by P2P lending platforms is
accomplishing this goal.
2. Risk Management and Behavior Monitoring
A weakness of P2P lending platforms is the incentive mismatch
between lenders and the platforms. The platforms take an origination fee
and then a relatively small fee for the continued servicing of the loan.113
This compensation structure may incentivize the P2P platforms to
originate loans with little regard for the borrowers’ potential to default
given the borrower’s responsibility for repaying the notes is contingent
upon the borrowers’ repayment of the loan.114 The small size of the loans
also makes it inefficient for the platform and the lender to pursue
delinquent borrowers either on their own or through a third-party debt
collection agency.115
The SEC’s current registration requirement reduces the risk for
lenders who use Prosper and Lending Club by theoretically requiring
disclosure of these risks to lenders through the Section 5 registration and
prospectus process.116 However, the SEC’s registration process is not
ideally suited for retail investors seeking to lend extra capital through one
of these platforms.117 Any future regulation should seek to optimize risk
109
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management by either adjusting the liability imposed on P2P platforms for
defaults or utilizing some other mechanism to correct the mismatch of
incentives.118
3. Maturity Transformation
Maturity Transformation refers to “the asset-liability mismatch
that results from the short-term funding of long-term projects.”119 This is
less of a problem with P2P lenders than with traditional banks, since P2P
lenders, in theory, rely on customers who are willing to invest in the fullterm of the loans advanced to borrowers120 unlike banks that rely on shortterm funding for long-term loans. However, this could be a problem for
marketplace lenders that self-fund their loans and then, like banks, rely on
the secondary markets or securitization to fund new loans. As consumers
become more reliant on access to capital through these online lenders, the
failure of a major lender could significantly disrupt the financial system.
4. Interconnectedness and Concentration
Interconnectedness and concentration in the financial markets
were among the primary contributors to the 2008 financial crisis.121 In his
article, Schwarcz discusses the importance of limiting the effects of any
shocks to the financial system by breaking the transmission of those
shocks.122 Globally, macroprudential regulators and oversight committees
have proposed various tools for dealing with the transmission of risk
including ring-fencing, contingent capital, and counter-cyclical capital
requirements for financial system participants.123 Unfortunately, many of
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these tools seem poorly adapted to the P2P lending sector. Thus far, this
has not been an issue due to the relatively small size of the P2P lending
sector compared to other parts of the financial services sector.124
Recent trends in the P2P market show the potential for
concentration within smaller market segments.125 The failure of one or two
P2P lending platforms in a niche market has the potential to destroy access
to credit within those niche markets and cause a credit crisis—at least
within that market—if reliance on those lenders is great enough. The
FCA’s imposition of capital requirements on P2P lenders may mitigate
these risks.126
The other issue that may arise as the industry matures is the
interconnectedness that arises from a secondary market for P2P loans. The
first securitization of P2P loans has already taken place.127 With
securitization, many of the benefits of disaggregation native to the P2P
lending model could be lost if platforms and the initial lenders rely on large
financial institutions to provide a robust secondary market for these loans.
Any future regulation of P2P lenders should consider the
interconnectedness of the industry and the potential for risk to transmit
through the system causing mini-credit crises.

CONCLUSION
The advantages of P2P lending are clear, but the regulatory
responses to this new industry are inadequate thus far. The U.S.’s
fragmentary model of regulation offers the least hope for a comprehensive
and well-thought out response to the risks posed by P2P lending. The
fragmented model also presents the greatest chance for burdensome and
uncoordinated regulation to stifle future innovation in the industry.128 The
U.K. offers a promising example for the U.S. to follow, because a single
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regulator taking a functional approach to regulation would certainly be the
ideal.
Rethinking the balance between the benefits provided by P2P
lending and the risks posed by the industry can help regulators arrive at an
optimal regulatory structure. Part of rethinking the regulation of P2P
lending might begin by looking at other situations where access to credit
trumps greater regulation in importance. For instance, bank loans and
notes are not subject to SEC regulations even though banks are serving the
same function as the lenders on P2P platforms.129 The bankruptcy code
also allows companies to issue securities without complying with SEC
regulations presumably because solvency and debtor rehabilitation are
valued higher than investor protection in this situation.130
The relative youth of the P2P lending industry131 should inspire
governments and regulators to take a proactive approach to designing
comprehensive and thoughtful solutions that spur innovation and protect
investors, borrowers, and the financial systems that rely on the efficient
allocation of capital through these platforms.
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